The Western lobbying company Qorvis helps 2Rivers, previously known as Coral Energy, one of the key structures of Russia’s "shadow fleet," establish contacts with representatives of the U.S. government.This was reported in his blog for Censor.NET by Candidate of Political Sciences and Director of the Institute of World Policy, Yevhen Mahda.
2Rivers is one of the key companies in the system of Russia’s "shadow fleet." The company owns more than 100 vessels that transport Russian oil and petroleum products worldwide. Its founders, Azerbaijani citizens Tahir Garaev and Etibar Eyub, are currently under UK sanctions. At the same time, the European Union has imposed sanctions on a significant part of the group’s structure involved in the transportation and sale of Russian oil. Meanwhile, the United States has taken a limited approach, imposing sanctions only on certain subsidiaries of 2Rivers, Voliton DMCC and Bellatrix Energy Limited.
2Rivers is also under investigation by U.S. government agencies over the use of sanctions-evasion schemes and the organization of Russian oil trade through alternative logistical and legal mechanisms.
According to Mahda, despite the company’s toxicity and its ties to Russian oil logistics, since mid-2024 Qorvis has not only been advising 2Rivers but also helping it build high-level contacts with representatives of the U.S. government.
"This concerns interaction with the U.S. Department of the Treasury, in particular with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the body responsible for enforcing sanctions," Mahda reports.
According to the expert, such lobbying creates the risk of actually weakening sanctions pressure.
Formally, the restrictions may remain in force, but access to officials and the ability to influence how their position is presented allow toxic companies to reduce the political and legal consequences of sanctions. That is why, Mahda believes, Qorvis should publicly explain why it serves the interests of a structure linked to Russian oil and the "shadow fleet."
"We have every right to ask why an American lobbying company is serving the interests of a structure linked to Russian oil and the "shadow fleet.’ Under the rules of this market, it cannot avoid an answer," Mahda notes.
Blogger Serhii Naumovych also draws attention to the issue. He emphasizes that this is not about technical consulting or ad hoc communication support, but about work at the highest level within Qorvis itself.
"The company’s top leadership is involved in this process – CEO Matt Lauer and Managing Director of the Dubai office Grace Fenstermaker. Fenstermaker previously worked at SOCAR Trading, and a significant part of the 2Rivers team also has ties to this structure, which indicates deep personnel and operational overlaps within this network," the blogger notes.
Naumovych also points out that Qorvis’s activities are not limited to the 2Rivers case. According to him, the company has previously worked with clients whose reputations raised significant political and ethical concerns.
In particular, after the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi, Qorvis helped "whitewash" the reputation of the Saudi royal family, receiving tens of millions of dollars for it.
In addition, Qorvis currently advises Mercuria, one of the world’s largest independent traders. Previously, the company received about $1.2 million for lobbying on behalf of the Russian gas producer OAO Novatek between 2014 and 2017. At the end of 2024, Qorvis also registered the Union of Russian Oil and Gas Producers as a client in accordance with U.S. federal lobbying disclosure requirements.
According to Naumovych, this indicates the systematic nature of Qorvis’s work with clients linked to the Russian energy sector. In such cases, lobbying companies do not directly participate in transporting oil or evading sanctions, but they provide something else: reputational, legal, and political cover.
"This is not an accidental episode but a clear business profile of the company. And this is a problem of a different level. Qorvis does not transport oil, does not own tankers, and is not part of the physical export chain. But it is precisely such companies that do what makes this system work. They provide toxic business with professional cover, political acceptability, and access to decision-makers," Naumovych notes.
He added that the Russian economy relies not only on its own resources and sanctions-evasion schemes, but also on the willingness of part of Western business to service its interests.
"It also relies on the willingness of part of Western business to take money for servicing it and its de facto legalization," he believes.
In this context, experts call on the Ukrainian state to respond more actively to such cases. In their view, this is not only about exposing the reputation of a specific lobbying company, but also about the need to make cooperation with entities of Russia’s oil infrastructure politically dangerous for all participants in such processes.
"We must do everything to ensure that such cooperation becomes toxic, politically dangerous, and reputationally unprofitable for all its participants. Right now, this is one of those issues where the work of the Commissioner for Sanctions Policy Vladyslav Vlasiuk must be not formal, but tough, public, and effective," Mahda notes.